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Abstract. Gaussian elimination is used in special linear groups to solve the word problem. In this
paper, we extend Gaussian elimination to unitary groups. These algorithms have an application in
building a public-key cryptosystem, we demonstrate that.
1. Introduction
Gaussian elimination is a very old theme in computational mathematics. It was developed to solve
linear simultaneous equations. The modern day matrix theoretic approach was developed by John
von Neumann and the popular textbook version by Alan Turing. Gaussian elimination has many
applications and is a very well known mathematical method. We will not elaborate on it any further,
but will refer an interested reader to a nice article by Grcar [11]. The way we look at Gaussian
elimination is: it gives us an algorithm to write any matrix of the general linear group, GL(d,K),
of size d over a field K as the product of elementary matrices and a diagonal matrix with all ones
except one entry, using elementary operations. That entry in the diagonal is the determinant of the
matrix. There are many ways to look at this phenomena. One simple way is: one can write the
matrix as a word in generators. So in the language of computational group theory the word problem
in GL(d,K) has an efficient algorithm – Gaussian elimination.
We write this paper to say that one can have a very similar result with unitary groups as well.
We define elementary matrices and elementary operations for unitary groups. These matrices
and operations are similar to that of elementary transvections and elementary row-column operations
for special linear groups. Using these elementary matrices and elementary operations, we solve the
word problem in unitary groups in a way that is very similar to the general linear groups. Similar
algorithms are being developed for other classical groups and will be presented elsewhere.
In this paper, we work with a different set of generators than that is usual in computational group
theory. The usual generators are called the standard generators [14, Tables 1&2]. Our generators,
we call them elementary matrices and are defined later, have their root in the root spaces in Lie
theory [6, Sections 11.3, 14.5] and have the disadvantage of being a larger set compared to that of
the standard generators. However, standard generators being “multiplicative” in nature, depends on
the primitive element of a finite field, works only for finite fields. On the other hand, our generators,
work for arbitrary fields. Using standard generators, one needs to solve the discrete logarithm problem
often. No such need arises in our case. In the current literature, the best row-column operations in
unitary groups is by Costi [9] and implemented in Magma [3] by Costi and C. Schneider. Using their
magma function ClassicalRewriteNatural, we show that our algorithm is much faster, see Figure 1.
A need for row-column operations in classical groups was articulated by Seress [19, Page 677] in
1997. Computational group theory and in particular constructive recognition of classical groups have
come a long way till then. We will not give a historical overview of this, an interested reader can find
such an overview in the works of Brooksbank [5, Section 1.1], Leedham-Green and O’Brien [14, Section
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1.3] and O’Brien [17]. Two recent works that are relevant to our work are Costi [9] and Ambrose
et. al. [1].
In this paper, we only deal with unitary groups defined by the Hermitian form β defined later.
The Hermitian form for the even-order case works for all characteristic. However, in the odd-order
case the 2 in the upper-left makes it useless in the even characteristic. One can change this 2 to a 1
in β, however, then one needs to compensate that by putting 1
2
in the generators. We tried, but were
unable to extend our algorithm for the odd-order unitary group to even characteristic. For even-order
unitary groups, the algorithm developed in this paper works for all characteristic. However, for the
odd-order case only odd characteristic will be considered.
1.1. Notations. For the rest of the paper, let K be a quadratic extension of the field k.There is an
automorphism of degree two involved with these extensions and will be denoted by σ : x 7→ x¯. In
the case of C : R, σ is the complex conjugation. In the case of a finite field Fq2 : Fq, σ is the map
x 7→ xq. We fix a non-zero ε ∈ K with ε¯ = −ε. Then every x ∈ K is of the form x = a + εb. We
denote Ko = {x ∈ K | x¯ = −x}. We also denote K1 = {x ∈ K | xx¯ = 1}. A d× d matrix X is called
Hermitian (skew-Hermitian) if TX¯ = X (TX¯ = −X). Two important examples of K : k pairs that we
have in mind are C : R and Fq2 : Fq.
The main result that we prove in this paper follows. The result is well known, however the
algorithmic proof of the result is original. Moreover, this algorithm is of independent interest in
other areas, for example, constructive recognition of classical groups.
Theorem A. For d ≥ 4, using elementary operations, one can write any matrix A in U(d,K),
the unitary group of size d over K, as product of elementary matrices and a diagonal matrix. The
diagonal matrix is of the following form:
•

1
. . .
1
λ
1
. . .
1
λ¯−1

where λλ¯−1 = detA and d = 2l.
•

α
1
. . .
1
λ
1
. . .
1
λ¯−1

where αα¯ = 1 and αλλ¯−1 = detA and d = 2l + 1.
Here λ¯ is the image of λ under the automorphism σ.
A trivial corollary (Theorem 6.1) of our algorithm is very similar to a result by Steinberg [20, §6.2],
where he describes the generators of a projective-unitary group over odd characteristic. Our work
is somewhat similar in nature to the work of Cohen et. al. [8], where the authors study generalized
row-column operations in Chevalley groups. They did not study twisted groups.
We use the algorithm developed to construct a MOR cryptosystem in unitary groups and study
its security. From the discussion in Section 6 of this paper it follows:
Theorem B. The security of the MOR cryptosystem over U(d, q2) is equivalent to the hardness of
the discrete logarithm problem in Fq2d.
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2. Unitary Groups
One of the legendary works of Chevalley [7] is a way to construct groups over an arbitrary field
from a complex simple Lie algebra. These groups are now called Chevalley groups in his honor.
Steinberg [20] generalized Chevalley’s idea and introduced twisted Chevalley groups. These groups
are now called Steinberg groups. These groups can be constructed in those cases where the Dynkin
diagram of the underlying simple Lie algebra has a non-trivial symmetry. In this paper we work with
the twisted group of type 2Al, i.e., unitary groups.
Let K be a field with a non-trivial field automorphism σ of order 2 with fixed field k. Let V be a
vector space of dimension d over K. We denote the image of α under σ by α¯. Let β : V × V → K
be a non-degenerate Hermitian form, i.e., bar-linear in the first coordinate and linear in the second
coordinate satisfying β(x, y) = β(y, x). We fix a basis for V and slightly abuse the notation to denote
the matrix of β by β. Thus β is a non-singular matrix satisfying β = Tβ¯.
Definition 2.1 (Unitary Group). The unitary group is:
U(d,K) = {X ∈ GL(d,K) | TX¯βX = β}.
The special unitary group SU(d,K) consists of matrices of U(d,K) of determinant 1.
In this paper we work with split (i.e., maximum Witt index) Hermitian form. Recall that charac-
teristic of K is odd whenever d is odd. For the convenience of computations we index the basis by
1, . . . , l,−1, . . . ,−l when d = 2l and by 0, 1, . . . , l,−1, . . . ,−l when d = 2l + 1; where l > 1. We also
fix the matrix β as follows:
• d = 2l fix β =
(
Il
Il
)
• d = 2l + 1 fix β =
2 Il
Il
.
Thus the unitary group obtained with respect to this form is called the split unitary group.
There are two important examples of this split unitary group and subsequently of our algorithm:
the field of complex numbers C over reals R with σ the complex conjugation and the other, finite
field Fq2 over Fq with sigma being α 7→ αq. It is known that in both the cases there is only one
non-degenerate Hermitian form up to equivalence [12, Corollary 10.4]. Equivalent Hermitian forms
gives rise to conjugate unitary groups. In the case of a finite field, a unitary group will be denoted
by U(d, q2) and special unitary group as SU(d, q2). A word of caution: in the literature U(d, q2),
U(d,Fq) and U(d, q) are used interchangeably.
3. Elementary matrices and elementary operations in unitary groups
Solving the word problem in any group is of interest in computational group theory. In a special
linear group, it can be easily solved using Gaussian elimination. However, for many groups, it is
a very hard problem. In this paper we present a fast, cubic-time solution to the word problem in
unitary groups.
Gaussian elimination in SL(d,K) uses elementary transvections as the elementary matrices and
row-column operations as elementary operations. These elementary operations are multiplication by
elementary matrices. The elementary matrices are of the form I + tei,j (t ∈ K), where ei,j is the
matrix unit with 1 in the (i, j)th position and zero elsewhere.
In the same spirit, one can define Chevalley-Steinberg generators for the unitary group [6, Section
14.5] as follows:
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3.1. Elementary matrices for U(2l,K). In what follows, l ≥ 2. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, t ∈ K and
s ∈ Ko:
xi,j(t) = I + tei,j − t¯e−j,−i for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + tei,−j − t¯ej,−i for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + te−i,j − t¯e−j,i for i < j,
xi,−i(s) = I + sei,−i,
x−i,i(s) = I + se−i,i,
3.2. Row-Column operations for U(2l,K). Rephrasing the earlier definition in matrix format,
we have three kind of elementary matrices.
E1:
(
R
TR¯−1
)
where R = I + tei,j; i 6= j.
E2:
(
I R
I
)
where R is either tei,j − t¯ej,i; i < j or sei,i.
E3:
(
I
R I
)
where R is either tei,j − t¯ej,i; i < j or sei,i.
Let g =
(
A B
C D
)
be a 2l×2l matrix written in block form of size l× l. Note the effect of multiplying
g by matrices from above.
ER1 :
(
R
TR¯−1
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
RA RB
TR¯−1C TR¯−1D
)
.
EC1 :
(
A B
C D
)(
R
TR¯−1
)
=
(
AR BTR¯−1
CR DTR¯−1
)
.
ER2 :
(
I R
I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
A+RC B +RD
C D
)
.
EC2 :
(
A B
C D
)(
I R
I
)
=
(
A AR +B
C CR +D
)
.
ER3 :
(
I
R I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
A B
RA+ C RB +D
)
.
EC3 :
(
A B
C D
)(
I
R I
)
=
(
A+BR B
C +DR D
)
.
3.3. Elementary matrices for U(2l+1,K). For l ≥ 2, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, t ∈ K, s ∈ Ko and characteristic
of K odd
xi,j(t) = I + tei,j − t¯e−j,−i for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + tei,−j − t¯ej,−i for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + te−i,j − t¯e−j,i for i < j,
xi,−i(s) = I + sei,−i,
x−i,i(s) = I + se−i,i,
xi,0(t) = I − 2t¯ei,0 + te0,−i − tt¯ei,−i,
x0,i(t) = I + te0,i − 2t¯e−i,0 − tt¯e−i,i,
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3.4. Row-Column operations for U(2l + 1,K). Rephrasing in matrix format:
E1:
1 R
TR¯−1
 where R = I + tei,j; i 6= j.
E2:
1 I R
I
 where R is either tei,j − t¯ej,i; i < j or sei,i.
E3:
1 I
R I
 where R is either tei,j − t¯ej,i; i < j or sei,i.
E4:

 1 R−2R¯ I −TRR¯
I
 whereR = tei 1 RI
−2R¯ −TRR¯ I
 where R = tei
Here ei is the row vector with 1 at ith place and zero elsewhere. Let g =
α X YE A B
F C D
 be a
(2l+1)×(2l+1) matrix where A,B,C,D are l×l matrices. The matrices X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xl), Y =
(Y1, Y2, . . . , Yl), E = T(E1, E2, . . . , El) and F = T(F1, F2, . . . , Fl) are rows of length l. Furthermore
α ∈ K. Note the effect of multiplication by elementary matrices from above is as follows:
ER1 :
1 R
TR¯−1
α X YE A B
F C D
 =
 α X YRE RA RB
TR¯−1F TR¯−1C TR¯−1D
 .
EC1 :
α X YE A B
F C D
1 R
TR¯−1
 =
α XR Y TR¯−1E AR BTR¯−1
F CR DTR¯−1
 .
ER2 :
1 I R
I
α X YE A B
F C D
 =
 α X YE +RF A+RC B +RD
F C D
 .
EC2 :
α X YE A B
F C D
1 I R
I
 =
α X XR + YE A AR +B
F C CR +D
 .
ER3 :
1 I
R I
α X YE A B
F C D
 =
 α X YE A B
RE + F RA+ C RB +D
 .
EC3 :
α X YE A B
F C D
1 I
R I
 =
α X + Y R YE A+BR B
F C +DR D
 .
For E4 we only write the equations that we need later.
• Let the matrix g has C = diag(d1, . . . , dl).
ER4 : [(I + te0,−i − 2t¯ei,0 − tt¯ei,−i)g]0,i = Xi + tdi
EC4 : [g(I + te0,−i − 2t¯ei,0 − tt¯ei,−i)]−i,0 = Fi − 2t¯di.
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• Let the matrix g has A = diag(d1, . . . , dl).
ER4 : [(I + te0,i − 2t¯e−i,0 − tt¯e−i,i)g]0,i = Xi + tdi
EC4 : [g(I + te0,−i − 2t¯ei,0 − tt¯ei,−i)]i,0 = Ei − 2t¯di.
3.5. Row-interchange matrices. We need certain row interchange matrices, multiplication with
these matrices from left, interchanges ith row with −ith row for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. These are certain Weyl
group elements. These matrices can be produced as follows: for s ∈ Ko,
wi,−i(s) = xi,−i(s)x−i,i(−s−1)xi,−i(s) = I + sei,−i − ei,i − s−1e−i,i − e−i,−i.
Note that our row interchange multiplies one row by s and the other by −s−1 and then swaps them.
This scalar multiplication of rows produce no problem for our cause.
4. Gaussian elimination in Unitary Group
Now we present the main result of this paper, two algorithms, one for even-order unitary groups
and other for the odd-order unitary groups.
4.1. The algorithm for even-order unitary groups.
Step 1: Input: Matrix g =
(
A B
C D
)
which belongs to U(2l,K).
Output: Matrix g1 =
(
A1 B1
C1 D1
)
which is one of the following kind:
a: The matrix A1 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0 and C1 is
(
C11 −λTC¯21
C21 c
)
where C11 is
a skew-Hermitian matrix of size l − 1 and λ¯c ∈ Ko.
b: The matrix A1 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m < l and C1 is
of the form
(
C11 0
C21 C22
)
where C11 is an m×m skew-Hermitian matrix.
Justification: Observe that the effect of ER1 and EC1 on A is the usual row-column oper-
ations on a l× l matrix. Thus we can reduce A to the diagonal form using classical Gaussian
elimination algorithm and Corollary 5.2 makes sure that C has the required form.
Step 2: Input: Matrix g1 =
(
A1 B1
C1 D1
)
.
Output: Matrix g2 =
(
A2 B2
0 TA¯−12
)
; A2 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
Justification: Observe the effect of ER3. It changes C1 by C1 + RA1. Using Lemma 5.5
we can make the matrix C1 the zero matrix in the first case and C11 the zero matrix in the
second case. After that we make use of row-interchange matrices to interchange the rows
so that we get zero matrix at the place of C1. If required use ER1 and EC1 to make A1 a
diagonal matrix, say A2. Lemma 5.4 ensures that D1 becomes TA¯−12 .
Step 3: Input: Matrix g2 =
(
A2 B2
0 A¯−12
)
; A2 is diag(1, . . . , 1, λ).
Output: Matrix g3 =
(
A2 0
0 A¯−12
)
; A2 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
Justification: Using Corollary 5.3 we see that the matrix B2 has certain form. We can use
ER2 to make the matrix B2 a zero matrix because of Lemma 5.5.
4.2. The Algorithm for odd-order unitary groups. Recall that for odd-order unitary groups
characteristic of K is odd. The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: Input: Matrix g =
α X YE A B
F C D
 which belongs to U(2l + 1,K);
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Output: Matrix g1 =
 α X1 Y1E1 A1 B1
F1 C1 D1
 of one of the following kind:
a: Matrix A1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0.
b: Matrix A1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m and
m < l.
Justification: Using ER1 and EC1 we can do row and column operations on A and get the
required form.
Step 2: Input: Matrix g1 =
 α X1 Y1E1 A1 B1
F1 C1 D1
.
Output: Matrix g2 =
α2 0 Y2E2 A2 B2
F2 C2 D2
 of one of the following kind:
a: Matrix A2 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0, E2 = 0 and C2 is of the form
(
C11 −λTC¯21
C21 c
)
where C11 is skew-Hermitian of size l − 1 and λ¯c ∈ Ko.
b: Matrix A2 is diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m; E2 has first m entries
0, and C2 is of the form
(
C11 0
C21 C22
)
where C11 is an m×m skew-Hermitian.
Justification: Once we have A1 in diagonal form we use ER4 to change X1 and EC4 to
change E1. In the first case these can be made 0, however in the second case we can only
make first m entries zero. Then Lemma 5.6 makes sure that C1 has the required form, call it
C2.
Step 3: Input: Matrix g2 =
α2 0 Y2E2 A2 B2
F2 C2 D2
.
Output:
a: Matrix g3 =
α3 0 Y30 A3 B3
F3 0 D3
 where A3 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
b: Matrix g3 =
α3 0 Y3E3 A3 B3
F3 0 D3
.
Justification: Observe the effect of ER3 and EC4. Then Lemma 5.5 ensures that C3 is
zero in the first case. In the second case, it only makes first m rows of C3 zero. Thus we
interchange remaining rows of C3 with A3 to get the desired result.
Step 4: Input: Matrix g3 =
α3 0 Y3E3 A3 B3
F3 0 D3
.
Output: Matrix g4 =
α4 0 00 A4 B4
0 0 TA¯−14
 with A4 = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) and α4 ∈ K1.
Justification: In the first case we already have E3 = 0 thus Lemma 5.8 gives the desired
result. In the second case, if needed we use ER1 and EC1 on A3 to make it a diagonal.
Lemma 5.7 ensures that A3 has the full rank. Furthermore, we can use ER4 and EC4 to
make E3 = 0. Then again Lemma 5.8 gives the required form.
Step 5: Input: Matrix g4 =
α4 0 00 A4 B4
0 0 A¯−14
 with A4 = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) and α4 ∈ K1.
Output: Matrix g5 = diag(α, 1 . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ¯−1) where α ∈ K1.
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Justification: Lemma 5.9 ensures that B4 is of a certain kind. We can use ER2 to make
B4 = 0.
4.3. Proof of Theorem A.
Proof. Let g ∈ U(d,K). Using the Gaussian elimination above we can reduce g to a matrix of the
form diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ¯−1) when d = 2l and diag(α, 1 . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ¯−1) when d = 2l+ 1.
We further note that row-column operations are multiplication by elementary matrices from left
or right and each of these elementary matrices have determinant one. Thus we get the required
result. •
4.4. Asymptotic complexity is O(l3). In this section, we show that the asymptotic complexity
of the algorithm that we developed is O(l3). We count the number of field multiplications. We can
break the algorithm into three parts. One, reduce A to a diagonal, then deal with C and then with
D. It is easy to see that reducing A to the diagonal has complexity O(l3) and dealing with C and
D has complexity O(l3). Row interchange has complexity O(l2). In the odd-order case there is a
complexity of O(l) to deal with X, Y,E and F . In all, the worst case complexity is O(l3).
5. A few technical lemmas
To justify our algorithms we need few lemmas. Many of these lemmas could be known to an
expert. However, we include them for the convenience of a reader.
Lemma 5.1. Let Y = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, . . . , λ) of size l with number of 1s equal to m < l. Let X
be a matrix such that Y X is skew-Hermitian then X is of the form
(
X11 −λ¯TX¯21
X21 X22
)
where X11 is
skew-Hermitian and so is λX22 if λ 6= 0.
Proof. We observe that the matrix Y X =
(
X11 X12
λX21 λX22
)
. The condition that Y X is skew-Hermitian
implies X11 (and X22 if λ 6= 0) is skew-Hermitian and X12 = −λ¯TX¯21. •
Corollary 5.2. Let g =
(
A B
C D
)
be in U(2l,K).
(1) If A is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0 then the matrix C is of the form(
C11 −λTC¯21
C21 c
)
where C11 is an (l − 1)× (l − 1) skew-Hermitian and λ¯c ∈ Ko.
(2) If A is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m < l then the
matrix C is of the form
(
C11 0
C21 C22
)
where C11 is an m×m skew-Hermitian.
Proof. We use the condition that g satisfies Tg¯βg = β.
Tg¯βg =
(
TA¯ TC¯
TB¯ TD¯
)(
I
I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
TC¯ TA¯
TD¯ TB¯
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
TC¯A+ TA¯C ∗
∗ ∗
)
This gives TC¯A+ TA¯C = 0 which means A¯C is skew-Hermitian (note A = TA as A is diagonal). The
Lemma 5.1 gives the required form for C. •
Corollary 5.3. Let g =
(
A B
0 A¯−1
)
where A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) be an element of U(2l,K) then the
matrix B is of the form
(
B11 −λ−1TB¯21
B21 b
)
where B11 is a skew-Hermitian matrix of size l − 1 and
λ¯−1b ∈ Ko.
Proof. Yet again, we use the condition that g satisfies Tg¯βg = β and A = TA. •
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Lemma 5.4. A matrix
(
A B
0 D
)
belongs to U(2l,K) if and only if D = TA¯−1 and A−1B is skew-
Hermitian.
Proof. The proof is simple computation. •
Lemma 5.5. Let Y = diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ¯) be of size l where λ 6= 0 and X = (xij) be a matrix such
that Y X is skew-Hermitian. Then X = (R1 + R2 + . . .)Y where each Rm is of the form tei,j − t¯ej,i
with t ∈ K for some i < j or of the form sei,i with s ∈ Ko for some i.
Proof. Since Y X is skew-Hermitian, the matrixX is of the following form (see Lemma 5.1):
(
X11 X12
X21 x
)
where X11 is skew-Hermitian of size (l− 1)× (l− 1) and X21 is a row of size l− 1 and X12 = −λTX¯21
and x = λx
λ
a scalar satisfying λ¯x ∈ Ko. Clearly any such matrix is sum of the matrices of the form
RmY . •
Lemma 5.6. Let g =
α X ∗∗ A ∗
∗ C ∗
 be in U(2l + 1,K).
(1) If A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) and X = 0 then C is of the form
(
C11 −λTC¯21
C21 c
)
with C11 skew-
Hermitian and λ¯c ∈ Ko.
(2) If A = diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal m < l and X has first m entries 0 then
C is of the form
(
C11 0
∗ ∗
)
with C11 skew-Hermitian and X must be zero.
Proof. We use the equation Tg¯βg = β and get 2TX¯X = −(T¯CA+TA¯C). In the first case X = 0, so we
can use Corollary 5.2 to get the required form for C. In the second case we write C =
(
C11 C12
C21 C22
)
then the equation implies: −
(
C11 +
TC¯11 C12
TC¯12 0
)
=
(
0 0
0 2TM¯M
)
where M = (xm+1, . . . , xl). This
gives the required result. This implies X = 0 and C has required form. •
Lemma 5.7. Let g =
α X Y∗ A ∗
∗ 0 D
 be in U(2l + 1,K) then X = 0 and D = TA¯−1.
Proof. We compute Tg¯βg = β and get 2TX¯X = 0 and 2TX¯Y + TA¯D = I. This gives the required
result. •
Lemma 5.8. Let g =
α 0 Y0 A B
F 0 D
, with A an invertible diagonal matrix, be in U(2l + 1,K) then
αα¯ = 1, F = 0 = Y , D = A¯−1 and TD¯B + TB¯D = 0.
Proof.
Tg¯βg =
 α¯ 0 TF¯0 TA¯ 0
TY¯ TB¯ TD¯
2 I
I
α 0 Y0 A B
F 0 D

=
 2αα¯ TF¯A 2α¯Y + TF¯BTA¯F 0 TA¯D
2αTY¯ + TB¯F TD¯A 2TY¯ Y + TD¯B + TB¯D
 .
Equating this with β we get the required result. •
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Lemma 5.9. Let g =
α 0 00 A B
0 0 A¯−1
 ∈ U(2l + 1,K) where A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) is invertible then
B is of the form
(
B11 −λ¯−1TB¯21
B21 b
)
where B11 is skew-Hermitian and λ¯−1b ∈ Ko.
6. Finite Unitary Groups
In the next section, we talk about cryptography. In cryptography, we need to deal explicitly with
finite fields. In this context, when K = Fq2 , we prove a theorem similar in spirit to Steinberg [20,
Section 6.2]. The proof is an obvious corollary to our algorithm.
Theorem 6.1. Fix an element ζ which generates the cyclic group F×q2, the subgroup F
1
q2 is generated
by ζ1 = ζq−1. We add following matrices to the respective set of elementary matrices:
• h (ζ) = diag(1, . . . , ζ, 1, . . . , ζ¯−1) whenever d = 2l.
•
{
h (ζ) = diag(1, . . . , ζ, 1, . . . , ζ¯−1)
h (ζ1) = diag(ζ1, 1, . . . , 1)
whenever d = 2l + 1.
Then the group U(d, q2) is generated by elementary matrices and the matrices defined above.
6.1. Special Unitary group SU(d, q2). In the case of SU(2l, q2) a simple and straightforward
enhancement of our algorithm reduces a matrix g ∈ SU(2l, q2) to the identity matrix. Thus the word
problem in SU(2l, q2) is completely solved as with SL(d, q) using only elementary matrices; this is
particularly useful for the MOR cryptosystem. An analysis of a MOR cryptosystem similar to the
MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) [15] will be done in the next section.
For the reduction to identity, note that Theorem 1.1 reduces g to diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1 . . . , 1, λ¯−1).
However, since det(g) = λλ¯−1 = 1, we have λ = λ¯ and λ ∈ F×q . Now, for s = ελ where ε¯ = −ε,
wl,−l(s)wl,−l(−ε) = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , λ−1).
So if we add wl,−l(s)wl,−l(−ε) to the output of Theorem 1.1, we have the identity matrix.
In the case of SU(2l + 1, q2) we need to add an extra generator h(ζ1) = diag(ζ1, 1, . . . , 1) where
ζ1 is a generator of F1q2 . Now we can reduce an element of the form diag(α, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . , λ¯
−1) to
diag(1, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . , λ¯−1) by multiplying with the suitable power of h(ζ1). Note that finding the
suitable power involves solving a discrete logarithm problem. Then we use similar computations for
even-order case to reduce diag(1, 1 . . . , λ, 1, . . . , λ¯−1) to identity.
7. The MOR cryptosystem on unitary groups
Briefly speaking, the MOR cryptosystem is a simple and straightforward generalization of the
classic ElGamal cryptosystem and was put forward by Paeng et. al. [18]. In a MOR cryptosystem
one works with the automorphism group rather than the group itself. It provides an interesting change
in perspective in public-key cryptography – from finite cyclic groups to finite non-abelian groups.
The MOR cryptosystem was studied for the special linear group in details by Mahalanobis [15]. For
many other classical groups, except the orthogonal groups, the analysis of a MOR cryptosystem
remains almost the same. So we will remain brief in this paper and refer an interested reader to [15].
The description of the MOR cryptosystem is as follows:
Let G = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gs〉 be a finite group. Let φ be a non-identity automorphism.
• Public-key: Let {φ(gi)}si=1 and {φm(gi)}si=1 is public.
• Private-key: The integer m is private.
Encryption:
To encrypt a plaintext M ∈ G, get an arbitrary integer r ∈ [1, |φ|] compute φr and φrm. The
ciphertext is (φr, φrm (M)).
Decryption:
After receiving the ciphertext (φr, φrm (M)), the user knows the private key m. So she computes φmr
from φr and then computes M.
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To develop a MOR cryptosystem we need a thorough understanding of the automorphisms group
of the group involved. The automorphisms of unitary groups are well described in the literature. We
mention them briefly to facilitate further discussion.
7.1. Automorphism Group of Unitary Groups. First we define the similitude group. We need
these groups to define diagonal automorphisms.
Definition 7.1 (Unitary similitude group). The unitary similitude group is defined as:
GU(d, q2) = {X ∈ GL(d, q2) | TX¯βX = µβ, for some µ ∈ F×q }.
Note that the multiplier µ defines a group homomorphism from GU(d, q2) to F×q with kernel the
unitary group.
Conjugation Automorphisms: The conjugation maps g 7→ ngn−1 for n ∈ GU(d, q2) are called
conjugation automorphisms. Furthermore, they are composition of two types of automorphisms –
inner automorphisms given as conjugation by elements of U(d, q2) and diagonal automorphisms given
as conjugation by diagonals of GU(d, q2).
Central Automorphisms: Let χ : U(d, q2) → F1q2 be a group homomorphism. Then the
central automorphism cχ is given by g 7→ χ(g)g. Since [U(d, q2),U(d, q2)] = [SU(d, q2), SU(d, q2)] =
SU(d, q2) [12, Theorem 11.22], any χ is equivalent to a group homomorphism from U(d, q2)/SU(d, q2)
to F1q2 . There are at most q + 1 such maps.
Field Automorphisms: For any automorphism σ of the field Fq2 , replacing all entries of a
matrix by their image under σ give us a field automorphism.
The following theorem, due to Dieudonné [10, Theorem 25], describes all automorphisms:
Theorem 7.1. Let q be odd and d ≥ 4. Then any automorphism φ of the unitary group U(d, q2) is
written as cχιδσ where cχ is a central automorphism, ι is an inner automorphism, δ is a diagonal
automorphism and σ is a field automorphism.
As we saw above there are three kind of automorphisms in an unitary group. One is conjugation
automorphism, the others are central and field automorphisms. A central automorphism being
multiplication by an element of the center, that is a field element. Exponentiation of that will be a
discrete logarithm problem in Fq. Similar is the case with a field automorphism. So the only choice
for a better MOR cryptosystem is a conjugating automorphism.
Once, we have decided that the automorphism that we are going to use in the MOR cryptosystem
will act by conjugation. Further analysis is straightforward and follows [15, Section 7]. Recall that we
insisted that automorphisms in the MOR cryptosystem are presented as action on generators. In this
case, the generators are elementary matrices and the group is a special unitary group of even-order.
Other groups can be used and analyzed similarly. Note that two things can happen: one can find
the conjugator element for the automorphism in use, finding the conjugator up to a scalar multiple
is enough. Or one cannot find the conjugator in the automorphism.
In the first case, the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism becomes a discrete logarithm
problem in a matrix group. Assume that we found the conjugating matrix A up to a scalar multiple,
where A ∈ GU(d, q2). Now the discrete logarithm problem in φ becomes a discrete logarithm problem
in A. One can show that by suitably choosing A, the discrete logarithm in A is embedded in the
field Fq2d . This argument is presented in details [15, Section 7.1]. We will not repeat it here. In the
next section (reduction of security), we show that one can find this conjugating element for unitary
groups and this gives us a proof of Theorem B.
The success of any cryptosystem comes from a balance between speed and security. In this paper,
we deal with both speed and security of the MOR cryptosystem briefly. For an implementation of the
MOR cryptosystem, we need to compute power of an automorphism. The algorithm of our choice is
the famous square-and-multiply algorithm. Since we do not use any special algorithm for squaring,
squaring and multiplying is the same for us. So we talk about multiplying two automorphisms. We
present the automorphisms as action on generators, i.e., φ(gi) is a matrix for i = 1, 2, . . . , s. The first
12 MAHALANOBIS AND SINGH
step of the algorithm is to find the word in generators from the matrix1. So now the automorphism
is φ(gi) = wi where each wi is a word in generators. Once that is done then composing with an
automorphism is substituting each generator in the word by another word. This can be done fast.
The challenging thing is to find the matrix corresponding to the word thus formed. This is not a hard
problem, but can be both time and memory intensive. What is the best way to do it is still an open
question! However, there are many shortcuts available. One being an obvious time-memory trade off,
like storing matrices corresponding to a word in generators. The other being there are many trivial
and non-trivial relations among these generators and moreover these generators are sparse matrices.
One can use these properties in the implementation.
This problem, which is of independent interest in computational group theory and is the reason
that we insist on automorphisms being presented as generators for the MOR cryptosystem. For more
information, see [15, Section 8].
7.2. Reduction of security. In this subsection, we show that for unitary groups, the security of
the MOR cryptosystem is the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in Fq2d . This is the same as
saying that we can find the conjugating matrix up to a scalar multiple. Let φ be an automorphism
that works by conjugation, i.e., φ = ιg for some g and we try to determine g.
Step 1: The automorphism φ is presented as action on generators. Thus φ(xi,−i(s)) = g(I +
sei,−i)g−1 = I + sgei,−ig−1. This implies that we know εgei,−ig−1 and similarly εge−i,ig−1 for fixed
s = ε. We first claim that we can determine N := gD where D is diagonal.
When d = 2l, write g in the column form [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l]. Now,
(1) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] εei,−i = [0, . . . , 0, εGi, 0, . . . , 0] whereGi is at−ith place. Multiplying
this with g−1 gives us scalar multiple of Gi, say di.
(2) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] εe−i,i = [0, . . . , 0, εG−i, 0, . . . , 0] where G−i is at ith place. Multiply-
ing this with g−1 gives us scalar multiple of G−i, say d−i.
Thus we get N = gD where D is a diagonal matrix diag(d1, . . . , dl, d−1, . . . , d−l). In the case when
d = 2l+1 we write g = [G0, G1, . . . , Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] and get scalar multiple of columns Gi and G−i.
We now use xi,0(t) and x0,i(t) to get linear combination of G0 with Gi or G−i, say we get αG0+βG−1.
In this case we get N = gD where D is of the form
α
d1
. . .
dl
β d−1
. . .
d−l

.
Step 2: Now we compute N−1φ(xr(t))N = D−1g−1(gxr(t)g−1)gD = D−1xr(t)D. Substituting
various xr(t) it amounts to computing D−1erD. When d = 2l, we first compute D−1(ei,j − e−j,−i)D
and get d−1i dj, d
−1
−i d−j for i 6= j. Then we compute D−1ei,−iD,D−1e−i,iD and get did−1−i , d−id−1i . We
form a matrix
diag(1, d−12 d1, . . . , d
−1
l d1, d
−1
−1d1, . . . , d
−1
−l d1)
and multiply it to N = gD to get d1g. Thus we can determine g up to a scalar multiple and the
attack follows [15, Section 7.1.1].
In the case d = 2l+ 1, the matrix D is almost a diagonal matrix except the first column. However
while computing D−1(e12− e−2,−1)D we also get d−1−2β and by computing D−1(e0,1− 2e−1,0− e−1,1)D
we get α−1D. Thus we can multiply αG0+βG−1 by β−1d1 = β−1d−2d−1−2d−1d
−1
−1d1 and get αβ−1d1G0+
d1G−1. With the computation in even case we can determine d1G−1 and hence can determine αG0.
Furthermore, since we know α−1d1 we can determine d1G0 thus in this case as well we can determine
d1g, i.e., g up to a scalar multiple.
1One can also present the automorphisms as word in generators, we choose matrices.
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Figure 1. Some simulations comparing our algorithm with the one inbuilt in Magma
8. Conclusion
For us, this paper is an interplay of finite (non-abelian) groups and public key cryptography.
Computational group theory, in particular computations with quasi-simple groups have a long and
distinguished history [2, 8, 13,14,16]. The interesting thing to us is, some of the questions that arise
naturally when dealing with the MOR cryptosystem are interesting in its own right in computational
group theory and are actively studied. The row-column operations that we developed is one example
of that. In the row-column operations we developed, we used a different set of generators. These
generators have a long history starting with Chevalley. In our knowledge, we are the first to use
them in row-column operations in Unitary groups. Earlier works were mostly done using the standard
generators. It seems that Chevalley generators might offer a paradigm shift in algorithms with quasi-
simple groups. In Magma, there is an implementation of row-column operations in unitary groups
in a function ClassicalRewriteNatural. We compared that function with our algorithm in an actual
implementation on even order unitary groups. To select parameters for our simulation, we followed
Costi’s work [9, Table 6.2]. In one case, the characteristic of the field was fixed at 7 and the size of
the matrix at 20, we varied the degree of the extension of the field from 4 to 34. We then picked
at random elements from the GeneralUnitaryGroup and timed our algorithm. The final time was
the average over one thousand repetitions. We did the same with the magma function using special
unitary groups. Times of both these algorithms were tabulated and is presented in Figure 1. In
another case, we kept the field fixed at 710 and changed the size of the matrix. In all cases, the final
time was the average of one thousand random repetitions. The timing was tabulated and presented
in Figure 1. It seems the our algorithm is much better than that of Costi’s from all aspects.
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